



BATHMUN

Conference 2025

BRICS+ Study Guide

*2035: Evaluating the Global Position of
BRICS+ in a Changing World*

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Message from the Chairs

Dear Delegates,

We are very pleased to welcome you to the Futuristic BRICS+ committee at this years BathMUN conference!

BRICS+ is a committee which is predicted by many to shape the world of the future, and so this committee is intended to give you the chance to predict how that future may play out. Will there be a change in the global world order, or will Western hegemony continue.

We appreciate that this being a futuristic committee will be a challenge for all, and we are here to help you throughout the process. Hopefully the study guide gives you a good overview of the major events within this new world, but if you have any questions please do let us know.

Talking of this study guide, is of course not a exhaustive document, to cover every nations position would lead to a 100 page document, but it does cover the key things you need to know. You will also soon receive individual country sheets, and these will outline your nations general position.

Overall though, we really look forward to welcoming you to the committee for this years BathMUN conference. Every year, Bath puts on one of the most enjoyable conferences of the year and we have no doubt this years edition will be the same.

We look forward to meeting you soon!

Tom & Tabea



Chair Introduction

Hi everyone, I'm Tom and I will be your Head Chair for this year's BRICS+ committee at BathMUN! I am a masters student at the University of Exeter, studying Conflict, Security and Development after recently graduating my undergraduate Law degree at the same university. I have been doing MUN for over 3 years now, including chairing at arguably too many conferences (if there is such a thing), and I also served on the Exeter MUN committee for two years, including being last year's training officer. Outside of MUN, you can often find me in the ram (Exeter's campus bar), where I will likely be talking about formula 1 or even potentially still talking about MUN. I look forward to meeting you all this November!

Thomas Probert
Co-Chair



Tabea Zimmermann
Co-Chair



Hey everyone! I'm Tabea and I'll be serving as your Co-Chair for the BRICS+ committee at BathMUN this November. I'm currently a second-year Bachelor's student at Leiden University in the Netherlands, studying International Relations and Organisations. I've been involved in MUN for several years now, starting back in high school, and this will be my 8th conference. While I've enjoyed participating as a delegate, I'm increasingly finding my passion in chairing as I continue in MUN. When I'm not buried in coursework or preparing for MUN, you'll usually find me in Iceland taking care of my horses and having long discussions about politics (and pretty much everything else) with my friends! I'm really excited to work alongside Tom and, of course, the BathMUN team to make this BRICS+ committee a fun and productive experience. Looking forward to meeting everyone and seeing some great debate in November!



Introduction to the Committee

BRICS+ in 2035 represents a dynamic group of seventeen full member nations operating as "a political and diplomatic coordination forum" for Global South countries (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025). The organisation has evolved from its original four founding members to become a significant force in reshaping international governance, with a substantial global population and economic influence.

Throughout this summit, delegates will serve as heads of state and government representing their respective BRICS+ member nations at the 2035 Summit. Delegates will engage in high-level diplomatic negotiations to address critical questions about BRICS+'s evolving role in global governance, economic coordination, and geopolitical positioning. The summit will culminate in the adoption of joint declarations and policy frameworks that will shape the organisation's trajectory through 2040.

Current Membership Structure

Full Members (17)

BRICS+ includes: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Algeria, Thailand, Nigeria, Bolivia, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan.

Partner Countries (8)

The BRICS partner countries are: Belarus, Singapore, Kazakhstan, Uganda, Bangladesh, Argentina, Turkey, and Vietnam. These partners can participate in BRICS+ initiatives and summits when there is consensus among full members.



Committee Origin

The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia on 16 June 2009, following initial meetings between foreign ministers in 2006 (BRICS Expert Council Russia, 2023). The BRIC group was renamed as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) after South Africa was accepted as a full member at the BRIC Foreign Ministers' meeting in New York in September 2010 (BRICS Expert Council Russia, 2023).

BRICS was founded "to serve as a political and diplomatic coordination forum" (BRICS Brasil 2025, 2025), standing on the premise that Western powers overly dominate international institutions, which have ceased to serve developing countries.

Organisational Structure

Governance Framework

- ◆ Decision-Making: Consensus-seeking approach reflecting sovereign equality.
- ◆ If any nation does not agree with a proposal put forward, they do not need to adhere to it.
- ◆ Leadership: Rotating presidency among five founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).
- ◆ Structure: No permanent secretariat, constitutive treaty, or dedicated budget.
- ◆ Operations: BRICS "does not have a constitutive treaty, its own budget, or a permanent secretariat" with operations conducted through "declarations and ministerial statements" that "have formed a legacy of shared decisions" (BRICS Brasil, 2025)



Institutional Network

BRICS has established almost 60 intra-group institutions and a network including think tanks and dialogues in various areas. The group has an agenda of over 30 subjects.

Key Institutions Include:

- BRICS Business Council
- BRICS Think Tanks Council
- BRICS Academic Forum
- BRICS Women's Business Alliance
- BRICS Deep-Sea Resources International Research Center and a BRICS Digital Ecosystem Cooperation Network (established at Kazan 2024)

Core Cooperation Areas

1. Economic Cooperation: Trade facilitation, investment promotion, and financial system alternatives
2. Diplomatic Coordination: Unified positions on global issues and multilateral forums
3. Infrastructure Development: Large-scale connectivity projects among member economies
4. Institutional: Challenging existing Western-dominated governance structures

Strategic Position in 2035

By 2035, BRICS+ faces critical tensions that delegates must navigate during summit negotiations. The hope for consensus increasingly strains under the weight of ideological differences between members, competing economic priorities between established and emerging economies, and divergent approaches to challenging Western-dominated international institutions. The summit occurs at a moment when BRICS+ must choose between deepening institutional integration or maintaining its flexible, declaration-based approach; a decision that will determine whether the organisation can fulfil its ambition to reshape global governance or fragment under the pressure of national interests.



Specialised Rules of Procedure

There will be multiple variations to the standard RoP in this committee, with these following the standard processes of BRICS+ in the modern day. Firstly, all substantive voting must be passed with an affirmative majority of $\frac{2}{3}$, rather than the usual simple majority. Alongside this, within BRICS+ it is only the nations which vote in favour of the resolution which have to implement its clauses, any nation which either abstains or votes against is not legally bound to implement it.

The other major difference with BRICS+ is the removal of the General Speakers List (GSL). Opening speeches will remain as normal, whereby each delegate has the opportunity in alphabetical order to provide an opening statement for a period of 90 seconds. After this, the GSL procedure is void and instead in its place will be a consultation of the whole (CoW) style process. This also voids the ability to yield to points of information (POI) during speeches outside of motions, but the presence of the CoW process enables delegates to target questions and yield time in a more free way than usual, with less direct moderation from the chairs.



Definitions

Brics Pay

“BRICS Pay is a decentralised digital payment platform developed within the framework of the BRICS Business Council to enable fast, secure, and seamless cross-border transactions. Designed on principles of interoperability, sovereignty, and inclusion, BRICS Pay connects national and commercial payment systems across BRICS+ nations — creating a resilient alternative financial infrastructure for businesses and individuals.”

Source: BRICS Pay

New Development Bank (NDB)

A multilateral development bank established in 2015 by the BRICS Nations to mobilise “resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs)”. Their headquarters are in Shanghai, and each of the five founding members contributed to set up this institution.

Source: National Development Bank

Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)

“A mutual financial support platform to which BRICS members can turn in the event of difficulties in their balance of payments.” Up to 2025, no participant country has required CRA Resources.

Source: BRICS Brazil 2025

SWIFT

Stands for The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system powers most international money and security transfers. SWIFT is a vast messaging network used by financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive information, such as money transfer instructions. This payment network allows individuals and businesses to take electronic or card payments even if the customer or vendor uses a different bank than the payee. SWIFT is the largest and most streamlined method for international payments and settlements.

Source: Investopedia



Bretton Woods Institutions

The Bretton Woods Institutions are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions were created in 1944 and were aimed at rebuilding "the shattered postwar economy and to promote international economic cooperation"

Source: Bretton Woods Project

De-dollarisation

"De-dollarisation entails a significant reduction in the use of dollars in world trade and financial transactions, decreasing national, institutional and corporate demand for the greenback." This additionally relates to the fact that the US Dollar is considered the world's main reserve currency, meaning it is widely used for international trade and transactions and is generally held by central banks.

Source: J.P.Morgan and Council on Foreign Relations

AfCFTA

Is a flagship project part of Africa's development Framework and is the African Continental Free Trade Area. This project was approved in 2012 by the AU (African Union) with the goal of facilitating trade and promoting socio-economic growth development. The AfCFTA entered into force in 2019, and trading under this idea commenced in 2021.

→ Guided Trade Initiative (GTI)

The GTI is a programme under the AfCFTA, allowing a select group of nations that are participating in the AfCFTA to start trading prior to legal and procedural requirements being met. The idea behind this initiative is to understand what is required to optimise operational aspects.

Source: *The African Continental Free Trade Area - AU and the Africa Trade Foundation*

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO is an intergovernmental organisation established in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The charter entered into force in 2003. The SCO primarily promotes cooperation and stability among member nations in areas such as trade, politics, security and culture.

Source: SCO



Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

This is a large China-led infrastructure project proposed in 2013 and intended to link East Asia to Europe through a collection of development and investment initiatives. However, the project has extended beyond the original investments into Africa, Oceania, and Latin America. The BRI is frequently controversial for the influence it allows China to have on the investments in countries' infrastructure.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

South-South Cooperation

"South-South cooperation refers to the technical cooperation among developing countries in the Global South. It is a tool used by the states, international organizations, academics, civil society and the private sector to collaborate and share knowledge, skills and successful initiatives in specific areas such as agricultural development, human rights, urbanization, health, climate change etc."

Source: UN



Topic Introduction

What began as an analytical construct devised by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001 to label growing economic nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China) has transformed into a group of countries seeking to challenge Western-dominated international institutions and establish alternative frameworks for global governance.

The trajectory from the original "Building Better Global Economic BRICs" report to the multi-member group reflects a change in power distribution, cooperation away from Western infrastructure and towards a more multipolar order. This transformation encapsulates not merely economic ascendancy but represents a comprehensive challenge to the post-1945 international system, encompassing financial architecture, diplomatic protocols, and the fundamental principles underlying global governance structures.

Early Political Development (2001-2011)

Jim O'Neill's 2001 Goldman Sachs research paper "Building Better Global Economic BRICs" identified Brazil, Russia, India, and China as possessing demographic, resource, and developmental characteristics that positioned them to become dominant global economic forces. The Goldman Sachs follow-up study "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050" reinforced projections of growing economic dominance of the BRICs, suggesting that they "could become a much larger force in the world economy" (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003).

The transformation of BRIC from economic concept to political reality commenced with the inaugural meeting of foreign ministers from the four nations organised on the sidelines of the 61st UN General Assembly in September 2006. This was a first step for Brazil, Russia, India and China to begin working collectively. (ipea, 2014)



The first BRIC summit elevated cooperation to the highest political level. The Yekaterinburg Declaration articulated foundational principles that would guide cooperation: calling for a more just multipolar world order based on international law and diplomacy, reform of international financial institutions to reflect contemporary economic realities, and enhanced representation of emerging economies in global governance structures (Kremlin, Russia, 2009). The inclusion of South Africa in 2010 was considered the first expansion and reflected strategic considerations beyond purely economic metrics. South Africa's addition provided BRICS with representation from the African continent. Generally, expansion of the group "strengthens BRICS' legitimacy and increases its diplomatic reach" (Leoni, 2025)



(BRICS, 2023)



Institutional Consolidation and Financial Innovation (2011-2020)

The period following South Africa's accession witnessed significant institutional development. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014, headquartered in Shanghai with an initial authorised capital of \$100 billion, represented the most tangible manifestation of BRICS' commitment to creating an alternative financial architecture (New Development Bank, 2024). The NDB operated on principles of equal representation, with each founding member contributing equally to the initial \$50 billion subscribed capital and rotating leadership positions.

Complementing the NDB, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was established in 2014 as an "arrangement that provides financial support to member countries in response to actual or potential balance of payments". (Bcb.gov.br, 2025) The CRA was designed to provide short-term liquidity support to members.

Despite institutional progress, BRICS faced significant challenges during this period. The 2014 Ukrainian crisis exposed fundamental disagreements among members regarding international law and sovereignty, while economic performance diverged significantly from optimistic projections. Brazil joined several nations in signing a resolution condemning Russia's actions, while other BRICS members used the opportunity to "distance themselves from the policy of Western countries" (Kugiel, 2022). Furthermore, the border tensions between China and India since 2017 have undermined the cohesion of BRICS nations, leading to clashes in 2020 and prompting India to strengthen ties with the EU and the US. (Kugiel, 2022)




Strategic Expansion and Contemporary BRICS+ (2020-2025)

The COVID-19 pandemic and intensifying US-China strategic competition created new imperatives for BRICS cooperation and expansion. Geopolitical tensions, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, paradoxically strengthened BRICS cohesion as non-Western nations sought forums for diplomatic coordination insulated from Western pressure. The organisation's commitment to neutrality on the Ukraine conflict, while controversial in Western capitals, reflected broader Global South sentiment regarding the limitations of Western-dominated international institutions.

The 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg marked an important moment with the decision to invite six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. (South Africa 2023 Presidency, 2023) This expansion reflected growing international interest in BRICS membership, with over 30 countries expressing formal interest. (BRICS Brasil 2025, 2025).

The expansion of BRICS to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (with Argentina withdrawing following President Javier Milei's election) created BRICS+, representing approximately 37.3% of global GDP and over 40% of the world's population (European Parliament, 2024). Furthermore, the creation of "partner country" status at the 2024 Kazan Summit demonstrated continued appeal as an alternative to Western-dominated institutions. Adding to BRICS expansion, Indonesia's accession in January 2025 strengthened representation in Southeast Asia.



BRICS+ economic cooperation has centred on creating alternative financial architecture that reduces dependence on Western-dominated institutions and the US dollar-based international monetary system. The New Development Bank had approved over \$30 billion in project financing since its establishment by 2025, while the organisation has promoted increased trade in local currencies and developed the BRICS Pay payment system. However, progress on currency cooperation remains limited by technical complexities and divergent national interests (New Development Bank, 2024).



Past Attempts to Solve the Issue

The BRICS+ current predicament between deepening institutional integration and maintaining flexible coordination has been a recurring tension throughout the group's history.

The 2014 Institutional Integration Debate

The establishment of the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2014 could be seen as an attempt to create more long-term institutional frameworks that to some extent replace some Western institutions, including the IMF. The creation of these organisations has "fostered distinct institutional traits". (Papa and Han, 2025) However, the simultaneous 2014 Ukraine crisis exposed some limitations to both the flexible coordination approach and the one of institutional integration. Brazil's decision to join Western nations in condemning Russia's actions revealed how formal institutional commitments could conflict with national foreign policy positions, while other BRICS members used the crisis to "distance themselves from the policy of Western countries" (Kugiel, 2022). This incident presents the challenges BRICS has to face in their approach to diplomacy and cooperation.




China-India Border Tensions and Organisational Flexibility (2017-2025)

The escalating border tensions between China and India since 2017, culminating in the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 that killed 20 Indian and 4 Chinese soldiers, tested BRICS' consensus-based approach (Scobell, Lalwani and Markey, 2024). India's subsequent strengthening of ties with the EU and the United States highlighted how bilateral conflicts could possibly undermine multilateral cooperation and challenge effective diplomacy. However, BRICS' flexible institutional structure prevented a group breakdown, as the absence of binding commitments allowed both parties to remain engaged despite bilateral tensions. This experience reinforced arguments for maintaining organisational flexibility rather than pursuing deeper integration that might have forced an institutional crisis. As Nuruzzaman (2022, p. 1025) argues, "occasional eruptions of serious tensions in China-India relations, underpinned by their 1962 border war, threaten to make BRICS an ineffective or weak organisation," yet the flexible approach allowed continued cooperation.

In September 2025, the dynamics between China and India publicly resurfaced following the 2025 China Victory Day Parade. Modi, the prime minister of India, attended the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit and held talks with Xi Jinping. However, instead of staying two more days to join the Parade, he consciously left after the SCO. The calculated appearance was influenced by the warm India-Japan relations and the border tensions, which still impact India-China relations (Clark, 2025). This reinforces that there are some fundamental tensions with their bilateral ties, despite improved channels of communication between these two nations. Deeper BRICS+ integration could likely be strained by India-China relations.





The 2022-2024 Expansion Tensions

The decision to expand BRICS membership in 2023, creating BRICS+, represented another point of tension with Russia and China favouring it while India and Brazil seemed more hesitant (Ferragamo, 2025). Reaching common ground is complicated by more members and dilutes the power of the individual nations.

These historical precedents established the parameters of the 2035 debate: with proponents of institutional integration pointing to the need for effectiveness and credibility, while advocates of flexibility emphasise the importance of maintaining consensus and preventing organisational fragmentation under pressure. BRICS+ nations want their voices respected within the group, yet how that reflects in the actions of the individual members is unclear.



Current Situation/Timeline of World Events

Europe

March 2026

Following a third harsh winter of war, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia shows no signs of moving, with neither side able to deliver any form of sizable progress against one another. Ukraine faces considerable pressure to end the conflict as support from the United States once again began to dwindle under the Trump administration. On the other hand, Russia faced internal pressure to bring an end to the conflict as social cohesion began to erode, with protests taking place in major Russian cities such as Moscow and St.Petersburg. Despite the efforts of the Russian government, these protests continued to occur. Due to these pressures, negotiations began between Ukraine and Russia to bring about an end to the conflict.

September 2026

Russia and Ukraine announce an end to the conflict, with Russia keeping hold of Crimea whilst formal referendums will be held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to establish the respective claims, with both Ukrainian and Russian supervisors present to oversee the elections' legitimacy. These two respective elections were won by Ukrainian supporters, though with a much narrower majority than expected, with allegations of fraud from both sides a major issue. As part of this agreement as well, Ukraine agrees not to apply for NATO membership for a period of 50 years, and cannot join the European Union for a period of 30 years. The conflict in Ukraine appears to now be settled, though the presence of separatist forces in the Donbas and Russian interference continue to pose challenges.



April 2027

The highly anticipated 2027 French Presidential election occurs, with Gabriel Attal facing off against socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon and far-right leader Jordan Bardella, who took the place of Marine Le Pen following her ineligibility to run for office. Bardella became the first national rally President of France after securing a convincing victory, capitalising on a souring of relations between the left-wing NFP and centrist Ensemble, whose alliance had been crucial to the National Rally's loss in the 2024 legislative elections. Bardella ran on an anti-immigration platform and promised lower taxes on French businesses with greater state control over these sectors.

March 2029

The German Federal elections occurred in this month which ended up being a mainly two-way fight between incumbent Chancellor Merz and his CDU party, against Alice Weidel who became the sole leader of the far-right AfD party. The CDU performed better than expected in areas formerly belonging to the SPD, however they struggled in the east of the country, whereby the AfD pulled in votes from across the country. In the end, small but crucial AfD gains in Western Germany led to them gaining a narrow victory of seats, leaving them with 20 seats more than the CDU and being the largest party in Germany. However, the CDU retained overall control of the Bundestag by forming an alliance with the SPD and Greens, with the goal of keeping the AfD out. Protests occurred within Germany, however, in the end Chancellor Merz retained his position, though he struggled to pass much legislation, due to the large presence of the AfD and the ideological differences between the CDU and the Greens. This deadlock eventually continued in the 2033 Bundestag elections whereby a minority CDU/Green government was formed, paralysed in economic and social policy but united in their effort to keep out the AfD.



(An image of Reform UK leader Nigel Farage declaring victory after the party officially reached the majority of seats in the 2029 UK General Election)



June 2029

The next UK general elections were due no later than August of this year, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer called the election for the start of the summer. Despite winning a landslide majority in 2024, the first term of the Labour government had struggled to achieve the economic growth it had targeted, and with this, it was unable to deliver the extensive change promised in the previous election. This, combined with the rise of Reform UK led to a staggering election result, with the latter party achieving an electoral victory that shook the British electoral system, with Farage's party winning 382 seats. Farage promised, similar to Bardella in France, pledging to be tough on immigration, reject globalisation, and to aggressively reduce taxes on corporations and individuals. Both Reform UK and Bardella went onto win re-election in 2034 and 2032 respectively, with National Rally also becoming the 2nd largest French legislative party behind the NFP in the next legislative elections.

March 2033

Following European major economies such as France and Germany struggling, mainly due to populist policies of low tax leading to high borrowing and high inflation, the economic state of the European Union was fragile. These low tax policies led to a variety of unfunded plans being implemented, with 'black holes' in public finances becoming present in these economies. These led to low confidence in European financial markets which led to investments being sold and markets dropping. In response to this, the EU collectively agreed on a stimulus package to reduce inflation however failed to agree on a mechanism for a long-term resolution to this issue. As such, whilst a market collapse was avoided thanks to EU intervention, the market instability was sufficient to cause many businesses and financial institutions to leave the European financial markets, with some opting for the US whilst others moved East to financial markets in China and Japan.



Latin America

October 2026-2034

The next Brazilian presidential election occurs, essentially a repeat of the previous one, with incumbent Lula facing off against Sao Paulo Governor Tarcisio de Freitas, who secured the endorsement of former President Bolsonaro. The election was close; however, Lula once again was victorious. Whilst violent protests erupted from right-wing supporters, the Lula administration's control over law enforcement meant the crisis was less widespread. Lula's victory cemented Brazil's future as a neutral moderating power. This started a string of strong electoral performances for the Brazilian workers party, with Former Minister of Finance Fernando Haddad succeeding Lula and becoming President of Brazil in both 2030 and 2034 elections. Haddad has vowed to continue Lula's legacy, prioritising global cooperation and positioning Brazil as a neutral power.

September 2030:

Hurricane season hits the northern Latin American nations hard, in particular Mexico which experiences the most hurricanes annually on record, 15 arrived in the previous annual period. This coincided with the hottest and driest summer on record in South America, wildfires becoming an increasingly frequent issue, more of them occurring from natural means, something not typically present in the region. Experts point to climate change as the driving factor and produce reports for the Organisation of American States (OAS) detailing the extent of this threat.

July 2033

Latin American nations join together to agree on a climate pact to collaborate in tackling both the effects of climate disasters, and to provide extensive support in relief efforts. This was initially proposed as a mechanism through the OAS, but was unable to be passed due to the blocking of the USA who did not wish to fund relief efforts in Latin America. A private agreement was signed in Brasilia, whereby Latin American nations sign a document pledging mutual support, and condemning nations such as the USA, China and India for extensive pollution. Latin American nations suffered economically due to the damage to natural resources like the Amazon rainforest.



Africa

September 2027:

Completion of the ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is completed, with all 54 states involved ratifying the proceedings. They follow the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI), which established processes for the distribution of a variety of goods, and with this policy's ratification the creation of an African single market is ever closer, with trade restrictions between the relevant nations being virtually non-existent.

May 2029

May 2029: The South African elections occur, this time with the main parties the ANC and DA both outperforming expectations, with the smaller parties such as the MK and EFF declining. This led to greater political stability within South Africa, as smaller parties had less disruptive power within the legislative system. Fikile Mbalula had led the ANC into the 2029 election, and then did so again in 2034. This increased share for the ANC/DA also led to great international confidence in South Africa's stability and subsequently provided an optimistic outlook on Southern Africa's economic future more generally.

July 2029

China announces a major expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within Africa, announcing increased investment to nations part of the AfCFTA. This investment focused on infrastructure such as roads and transport hubs in order to assist with the transport of goods to facilitate trade. Chinese construction contracts as part of the BRI reached \$120 billion US dollars within Africa during the year of 2028, and analysts suggest that due to this many African nations now enjoy much greater and closer ties to Beijing, whilst simultaneously moving further away from Western influence.




November 2031

The annual Africa Tech Festival occurs, with the focus being on harnessing new technologies such as artificial intelligence to improve infrastructure. This festival is held in Cape Town, where the South African government has poured large investments into such new technologies and innovations and advocated for other African nations to do the same.

February 2034

Economic performance within the AfCFTA has exceeded expectations, leading to economic growth of 15% in the newly created single market. This is due to a dramatic increase in trade between the relevant nations, and also due to the aforementioned investment in new technologies, which has allowed African states to improve their infrastructure and diversify their economic exports. Building on this, strong investment from China has also led to a dramatic building of infrastructure within Africa, in particular building transport routes to connect more nations to important ports.



(An infographic detailing initial 2035 projections from the AfCFTA, which is lower than the real economic gains)



North America

September 2026

Thanks to the end of the conflict in Ukraine, President Donald Trump enjoys a much-needed high approval rating, as up to this point he had struggled with a stagnant economy and a highly divided nation. However, this does not last long as reports emerge that President Trump was sidelined during negotiations and so his supporters begin to question his strongman approach. Alongside this, the large tax cuts enacted by the Trump administration led to a large reduction in medical coverage for millions of Americans, with protests regarding this ramping up in preparation for the midterms.

November 2026

The 2026 US Midterms occur, with the Republicans retaining the Senate majority at 50-50. However, the Republicans lost control of the House and Hakeem Jeffries became the first African-American speaker of the House. The Democrats picked up 10 seats, taking them to a total of 225 seats, compared to the Republicans' 210. These results caused President Trump major difficulties in passing his agenda, and caused a backlog in legislation due to Congress and the White House being split. Despite this though, President Trump doubles down on his aggressive tariffs policy, pledging higher tariffs on all nations which do not sign a new trade deal. This policy draws criticism from Congress however J.D Vance's tiebreaking vote in the Senate removed Democrats ability to prevent this. As such, US relations with many nations across the world is severely damaged.

November 2028



(President Newsom and Vice-President Warnock at the Democratic National Convention in 2028)



The US Presidential Election comes round, and this is viewed as an existential election for the US as their standing on the global stage has been dramatically damaged by Trump's economic policies. California Governor Gavin Newsom narrowly won the Democratic primary, notably garnering large support due to his strong approach against President Trump. He was also boosted by early endorsements from former Vice-President Harris and Minnesota Governor Walz, which gave him strong support from the 2024 campaign. Newsom chose Georgia Senator Raphael Warnock as his running mate in order to garner support in the Sun Belt, and they faced off against the Republican ticket of JD Vance and his running mate Marco Rubio, who easily swept their primary following the endorsement of Donald Trump whose MAGA loyalists carried Vance to the nomination. The election was close fought, however the Newsom/Warnock ticket edged the vote, with their popularity being increased as a result of their public opposition to President Trump's agenda. Democrats also retained control of the House and took control of the Senate, creating a Democratic trifecta. Protests occurred against the result but due to Donald Trump no longer being on the ticket, their ferocity and scale was muted compared to 2020.

● *November 2032*

The Newsom/Warnock term is coming to an end, the Midterms in 2030 delivered a mixed bag of results for the incumbents, with Democrats increasing their Senate majority but losing their House majority, leading to Mike Johnson once again becoming Speaker of the House. Overall though, the US economy was advancing thanks to a bold economic policy by the Newsom administration, focused on working with big businesses and new technologies not dissimilar to Newsom's previous policies in California. Thanks to this economic growth, Newsom/Warnock were elected to a second term in office, narrowly beating the Republican ticket of Marco Rubio and his running mate Tulsi Gabbard. The US economy continues to grow under the administration; however, concerns are present over a weakness in foreign policy, in particular when it comes to Asia, where Newsom has prioritised economic performance over strength on the issue of Taiwan and has not been seen as ineffective in preventing businesses from leaving European markets and moving towards the East.



November 2034

Whilst midterms do not lead to changes of control in either House of Congress, issues have persisted during President Newsom's term. Whilst economically the US has bounced back from Trump's tariffs, the foreign relations lost during Trump's term have not returned. European partners still are wary of the US attitude following 4 years of aggressive tariffs, and many nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia continued to turn to China and its growing influence, viewing them as a more dependable partner in global trade. President Newsom has also been viewed as ineffective on global tensions surrounding the South China Sea, with China and its partners increasing their naval presence off of Taiwan and also their financial investment in local nations, without the US being willing to intervene. US public attitude is against a strong interventionist approach on China, instead focusing on the need to prioritise US domestic issues, leading to a globally perceived weakness in the US policy.

Asia

November 2026

In response to the Trump administration's aggressive tariffs policy, China and India closed their economic relationship, signing a new trade deal which removes key trade barriers currently in place. The deal also provided economic incentives and policies aimed at increasing Indian trade exports to China, in order to address the trade imbalance that had been in place between the nations. This surprising move by China and India is directly attributed by experts to the policies of President Trump, and signalled the beginning of a process of increased economic cooperation between Eastern powers.



February 2028

Damaged by the economic policy of the US, the members of the ASEAN organisation hold their annual summit, with the summit's primary objective being to decide how to chart their own path forward. Nations that were typically more US-aligned began to express a preference towards turning to regional powers such as China, India and Japan for closer ties. This is in part due to Chinese naval vessels reducing their interference in ASEAN member nation's fishing vessels in the disputed areas in the South China Sea, with experts pointing to Beijing seeking to exploit the present unpopularity of the US in order to increase its own influence and strengthen diplomatic ties. ASEAN members release a communique condemning the economic policy of the US and express an intention to seek closer ties with other major powers.

July 2030

The Republic of Korea has completed its 5 year AI strategy, after pouring over 1 trillion Won into the project. As a result, South Korea has become a world leader in AI development, including boosting its domestic infrastructure. Key features of this project have included an AI data centre run by state apparatus, and they revolutionised the use of AI for investment and market predictions. This process has kickstarted an economy which struggled due to an aging population, and served as motivation for other Asian nations in the region to also invest in such technologies. In comparison, European nations have neglected to significantly invest state funding into this new technology for economic use.

March 2033:

Despite ever increasing domestic exports, Indonesia suffers greatly from climate related incidents. Over the 2032 year, a new record temperature of 43.6 degrees Celsius was set, which is 5.2 degrees Celsius higher than in 2024. This helped contribute to over 8000 climate related incidents over the 2032 year, including the nations largest ever flooding incident in March 2033, which caused over \$900 million US dollars in damage. Climate incidents cost the Indonesian economy over 7% of its GDP each year. This is not an isolated incident, almost all coastal based nations in South East Asia are currently grappling with the devastating impact of climate disasters, which in turn restricts their economic growth.



Case Studies

2033 European Market Instability

The 2033 European economic crisis was a result of multiple factors in multiple European nations. Initially, many nations were still recovering from the aggressive tariffs policy of the former US President Donald Trump, which had led to a reduction in trade between the EU and US which resulted in political tensions between the two. Whilst other regions recovered from these policies, the far right victories in France and the UK led to aggressive tax cut policies which drove up inflation and led to interest rates rising in the respective nations, also influenced by large scale 'black holes' in public finances.

These tax policies combined with RN's state regulation on businesses in France, had led to widespread unease and concern from businesses in these markets. This in turn led to dramatically reduced investment, cancelled infrastructure projects, and sluggish economic growth across the Eurozone and the UK. The resulting economic downsliding led to a record breaking stimulus package from the European Union to avert total collapse of the major EU economies, but this was controversial and is seen as only a temporary fix, and the economic performance in the UK led to dramatic cuts to public services. Economic growth is still slow and constantly outpaced by other regions, and this instability caused many other nations to consider whether Western controlled financial institutions are indeed the best form of regulation on the global economy.



2034 AfCFTA Economic Performance Report

As referenced in the world events section of this guide, last year there was an Economic Performance Review regarding the implementation of the AfCFTA, this review was undertaken by an independent African commission and is widely accepted by economic experts. The initial projections estimated an average economic GDP growth of 9%, however, within the same time frame it rose by 15%, bringing the group's total market from \$3.4 trillion to around \$3.9 trillion. Furthermore, initial projections estimated a 32% increase in African exports by 2035, with exports surpassing this projection with a substantial 40% increase. Additionally, foreign investment rose to 180% over the period between 2021-2035, surpassing projections which estimated between 111-159%, this mainly being driven by increased investment from China, India and also returning investment from the Russian Federation which has also commenced resumed investment programmes thanks to the end of the conflict in Ukraine and the partially lifted sanctions on Russia. The median inflation rate within AfCFTA nations also dropped, going from 4.5% in 2024 to 3.2% by 2035, thus assisting in reducing interest rates on loans for both individuals and corporations.

This report shows a wider economic movement that has occurred in the past decade. Regions such as Africa and Asia have enjoyed above expected economic growth and cooperation, leading to investments in new technologies and improving their global positioning. On the other hand, the same report noted how the African economy has rapidly been closing the gap on Western nations, who have economically struggled with high inflation and been the subject of bailout schemes as part of the 2031 economic instability. This report outlined a multi-year plan, which determined the economic power in the world had shifted out of the hands of Western nations. As such, this report also provided recommendations to African nations to begin lobbying for moving away from Western banking institutions such as the Bretton Woods organisations.



Points of Discussion

Economics and Finance

De-dollarisation

One of the central issues in current BRICS+ discussions is the question of de-dollarisation, driven by member states' concerns over the dominance and "weaponization" of the US dollar in global trade and finance as exemplified through the implementation of sanctions targeting nations such as Russia and Iran. The general perception of the US dollar as a stable and reliable currency has been fragmented due to United States' foreign policy. De-dollarisation has been a major point of discussion for BRICS+ for over a decade. Proposals have included revisiting proposals for alternative financial mechanisms, such as a potential BRICS reserve currency possibly backed by gold and a basket of national currencies, and blockchain-based cross-border payment systems such as BRICS Pay.

→ Should BRICS+ pursue a unified currency, adopt the Chinese yuan as a dominant trade currency (replacing the US dollar), or design a flexible multi-currency framework?

Alternative Global Finance Systems and Monetary Reforms

BRICS' push for monetary reform stems from structural changes in the global economy and discontent with the institutional status quo. China's rise as the world's largest trader and reserve-holder underscored the mismatch between economic realities and governance structures still dominated by the West. The use of SWIFT for sanctions against Iran (2012) and Russia (2022) amplified BRICS concerns about financial vulnerability. BRICS have already sought to develop parallel institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to explore new technologies to reduce reliance on Western-controlled infrastructure. Though underutilised, these institutions symbolise an attempt to carve out space in global finance and reduce exposure from Western dominance.



By 2035, the New Development Bank has expanded its role, but the IMF and World Bank still dominate global finance. Meanwhile, SWIFT continues to be the main system for international transactions, raising concerns about Western control.

→ Should BRICS+ focus on creating its own payment system and expanding the NDB as a true alternative to Bretton Woods, or continue pushing for formal reforms of the existing institutions?

Diplomacy/ Politics and Security

Membership Expansion

The opportunities for a BRICS expansion are clear - developing countries now command the majority of global GDP, the Global South has become a driver of world economic growth, and many nations outside BRICS see the association as an attractive platform to assert independence from Western-led governance. Expansion enhances BRICS' legitimacy and global reach, reinforcing its potential role as a voice for emerging economies. Yet challenges are equally pronounced: the increased diversity of members creates difficulties in achieving consensus, especially on sensitive issues, while the informal nature of BRICS institutions undermines consistent action. External pressures also complicate cooperation as individual BRICS members entertain bilateral agreements with Western states, risking fragmentation amongst members. While a larger membership boosts representation, diversity of interests has complicated consensus and slowed decision-making.

→ Is it more strategic for BRICS+ to keep widening its membership base to increase influence, or to slow expansion in order to strengthen internal cohesion through stricter entry requirements?

Identity of the Bloc

As Western influence declines, BRICS+ faces a strategic crossroads: remain an economic forum, evolve into a broader political alliance, or consolidate itself as a formal anti-west alliance.

Should BRICS+ transform into a formal political/security bloc with an explicit anti-Western identity, or maintain its flexibility as a multipolar balancing force?



Internal Conflict Resolution

BRICS+ faces a fundamental challenge in managing bilateral tensions while maintaining organizational cohesion. The China-India border tensions since 2017 demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of the bloc's flexible, consensus-based approach. While the absence of binding commitments allowed both nations to remain engaged despite their conflict, critics have questioned whether BRICS+ can effectively pursue deeper cooperation when major members harbour fundamental disagreements. The 2026 China-India trade deal exemplifies that crisis-driven cooperation is possible. However, expansions of BRICS+ means adding diverse members with potentially competing interests, meaning that the question of how to manage bilateral disputes within a multilateral framework becomes increasingly critical.

→ Should BRICS+ establish dispute resolution mechanisms to address bilateral tensions between members, or would such institutionalisation undermine the flexibility that has prevented organisational collapse? How should the bloc balance respect for bilateral sovereignty with the need for multilateral cohesion?



China and India's former leader following the 2026 trade deal)

Climate Concerns

Climate-related disasters have imposed severe economic costs on members like Indonesia (7% of GDP annually) and Latin American nations, prompting Brazil and other vulnerable states to advocate for coordinated climate positions within BRICS+. However, BRICS+ was not established as an environmental organization, and expanding into climate governance risks exposing divisions while diluting focus from core economic and diplomatic coordination.

→ Should BRICS+ incorporate climate cooperation or should members address environmental concerns through existing frameworks to keep the bloc focused on its core mission?



Bloc Positions/Example Nations

Pro BRICS+ Governance Bloc

This bloc is composed of nations which seek to establish BRICS+ as a more governance prevalent group, meaning they have a bigger collective role in world affairs compared to Western nations which have tended to control influential systems. Example nations of this bloc can be found below and also in the nation fact sheets.

China

China is widely regarded as the most prominent actor within BRICS, with its sheer economic size — five times greater than India's — and increasingly assertive foreign policy explaining its dominant position in the grouping. Building on this weight, China has, alongside Russia, emerged as one of the strongest advocates for BRICS expansion, taking on a leading role in strengthening institutional frameworks, standardising expansion procedures, and ensuring that BRICS maintains its credibility.

Its motivation for welcoming new members, particularly from regions such as the Middle East where its influence was previously limited, reflects Beijing's broader ambition to extend its geopolitical and economic reach. Furthermore, the weakening of U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia has been a critical factor enabling China to expand and solidify its regional influence.

Consistent with this outlook, China has framed BRICS in optimistic terms, presenting the bloc as both an innovative model of South-South cooperation and a symbol of the Global South's rise. This vision has translated into concrete policy leadership, most notably through China's central role in advancing the de-dollarisation agenda and spearheading efforts to curb U.S. dominance over the global financial system. In parallel, Beijing has expressed ambitions for BRICS to function as a counterbalance in global governance, pushing for institutional reform while encouraging an expansion of the bloc's remit into political and security cooperation.



To support these goals, China has also championed the expansion of the New Development Bank (NDB) and pressed for new economic initiatives that would further diversify and deepen areas of BRICS cooperation. Chinese scholars stress the value of the BRICS+ model, with regional committees enabling members to represent BRICS in their respective regions and facilitate structured engagement with other international organizations. By taking the lead in institutionalizing BRICS, China can enhance the bloc's cohesion and its legitimacy as a voice for the Global South.



(Chinese and Russian leaders Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin respectively, meeting in 2023 to discuss the recent European instability)

China

Despite the end of the Ukraine war, the Russian Federation has consistently still found itself at odds with the West and has publicly called for power to be taken away from those nations. President Vladimir Putin is still firmly in power, and has kept a firm grip on power within the nation. Russia has seen economic struggles with the EU and other nations moving away from Russia for their gas supplies. Alongside this, sanctions on Russian advanced technologies remained, all this leading to consistently sluggish economic growth.

Despite this, military investment remains high and has formed a cornerstone of Putin's regime, which has been controversial within Russia. Whilst mass scale protest has been largely unsuccessful due to strict crackdowns by Russian authorities, public dissent has become increasingly common due to a lowering in living standards for the general population, due to cutbacks in public funding due to the ever increasing military costs. As such, Russia is in need of changing the current path.

This means within this debate, they will be looking to ensure a new world order, focusing on nations such as Russia and China, which they see as the best way to ensure economic prosperity and also secure their position as a leading global power for future decades.



Climate Bloc

These nations have a particular focus on BRICS+'s role in combating climate change. They will have other focuses in the debate, but these nations share a common goal in combatting climate disasters, and this can clash with some of the other nations in the group.

Brazil

Brazil plays a balancing role within BRICS+, under President Lula da Silva, Brazil sought to repair relations with China, which had soured during the tenure of his pro-US predecessor Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022). In 2023 Brazil signaled a renewed economic engagement with China. Although Brazil has historically positioned itself in favor of multilateralism rather than alignment with one side, the erosion in economic and diplomatic relations with the US following the Trump administration's aggressive foreign policy has pushed Brazil to lean more heavily on China as a strategic and economic partner.

Despite Brazil's closer ties with China, it maintains a stance that BRICS should be a platform to push for reform of international institutions and as a vehicle for amplifying the voice of developing countries rather than becoming an explicitly anti-Western coalition or a counterweight to the G7, G20, and Western States.

On climate and environmental issues, Brazil has emerged as a leading voice within BRICS+ for coordinated climate action. As one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, it has pushed for the bloc to adopt a more united position on sustainability and environmental security. Brazil has emphasized the global significance of protecting the Amazon rainforest and has called for collective strategies on emissions reduction and renewable energy transitions. Its leadership on this front positions it as a driving force for integrating climate priorities into the broader BRICS+ agenda.



(An image of the aftermath of large scale flooding in Indonesia, showing the damage caused)



Indonesia

Indonesia has been one of the most heavily affected nations when it comes to the increase in climate disasters. Whilst economic output continues to grow in the nation, the impact of flooding and adverse weather is threatening this position. GDP is estimated to be 7% lower currently as a result of the growth in these incidents over the last decade, and as such Indonesia believes BRICS+ should have a role in keeping nations to account on their carbon footprint.


Whilst their focus on BRICS+ as a governing force may align with China and India in this scenario, they have been openly critical of these two superpowers over their climate impact and have publicly called on them to endorse more climate supporting measures. Indonesia is ready to collaborate with other affected nations to bring about what they view as essential reforms within BRICS+ nations. As also stated though, Indonesia is also a nation which aligns with the view of BRICS+ playing a more global leading role and they view the issue of climate change as another element of that responsibility.



BRICS at a Crossroads

The 2035 Summit convenes at the most consequential moment in BRICS+ history to date. In the past decades, BRICS+ has significantly expanded, the global order changed dramatically and new challenges have arisen. With the summit approaching, the very diversity that grants BRICS+ credibility as a Global South voice now threatens to paralyse its ability to act decisively. Inaction is not an option.

Western institutional credibility collapsed during the 2033 European financial crisis, triggering business migration to Eastern financial centres. American foreign policy under President Newsom (2028-present) prioritises domestic economic performance over international engagement, creating a vacuum in regions from Southeast Asia to Africa. Meanwhile, the African Continental Free Trade Area achieved 15% economic growth by 2035, demonstrating that deep integration among economically emerging nations is not only possible but transformative. This is a rare window where BRICS+ could fundamentally reshape global governance, but only if members can agree on what BRICS+ should become.



(Bricsington, 2023)



Guiding Questions

1. Should BRICS+ establish binding institutional frameworks with a permanent secretariat and enforceable commitments, or maintain its current flexible approach of declarations and voluntary implementation?
2. Should the group prioritise expanding the BRICS Pay system and local currency trading, or focus on reforming existing international monetary structures?
3. With 8 partner countries seeking closer ties and over 30 nations expressing interest in membership, should BRICS+ continue expanding or consolidate its current 17-member structure? How can the group balance inclusivity with decision-making efficiency?
4. Given the 2033 European market instability and declining Western economic dominance, should BRICS+ position itself as a replacement for Western-led institutions, or as a complementary alternative that can coexist with reformed global governance structures?
5. Beyond opposition to Western dominance, what positive vision and shared values should define BRICS+ identity?
6. The Newsom administration's (2028-2036) weakness on Taiwan and failure to prevent business migration from Europe to Asia have allowed China to increase its naval presence in the South China Sea. Should BRICS+ formalise its role as an alternative security architecture, or maintain its economic focus while geopolitical vacuums emerge?
7. The 2026 China-India trade deal, which removed key barriers, was directly triggered by Trump's aggressive tariff policy. Should BRICS+ institutionalise such crisis-driven cooperation mechanisms?
8. Does BRICS+ see itself primarily as a voice for Global South nations challenging Western hegemony, or as a pragmatic governance mechanism focused on delivering concrete benefits to member states? How do these two roles conflict or complement each other?



Additional Resources

For the preparatory efforts of the delegates, below is a list of materials to aid the understanding of BRICS+ dynamics and contemporary global governance challenges. Delegates are encouraged to supplement this list with other documents or media as it pertains to their specific nation's position and interests within BRICS+.

Primary Sources

Delegates should note that this study guide and the individual country information sheets distributed to each delegation closer to the summit (*date to be determined*) constitute the primary and authoritative sources for this committee.

Foundational BRICS+ Research

BRICS Source: Ferragamo, M. (2025). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding> [Accessed 20 Aug. 2025].

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Recommended Research Areas

You are also encouraged to go beyond these sources; however, please do keep take into consideration that this is a futuristic committee and therefore sources are unlikely to provide insight into the last 10 years. Delegates may find value in examining:

- Individual member state foreign policy priorities and economic strategies within multilateral frameworks
- Historical precedents of institutional reform versus replacement in international organisations
- Regional economic integration models (EU, ASEAN, AfCFTA) and their applicability to BRICS+ coordination
- Reports from member nations on BRICS+ strategic direction and challenges, eg. Think tanks
- Official BRICS+ summit declarations (2020-2025)
- New Development Bank operational reports and policy frameworks
- Member state government publications on BRICS+ participation strategies

Delegates should prioritise understanding the specific context and institutional dynamics outlined in this study guide when developing their positions for the 2035 summit.

Recommended Reading

"The evolving directions of the "Greater BRICS Cooperation" in the new era" -
<https://brics-econ.arphahub.com/article/129530/>



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